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In this paper, we study the incentives to adopt advanced abatement technologies in the
presence of imperfect compliance. Surprisingly, incentives to adopt advanced abatement
technologies remain intact under emission taxes and pollution abatement subsidies when
compared to the perfect compliance scenario. However, under emission standards imper-
fect compliance increases ﬁrms’ incentives to invest under certain assumptions, whereas
under an emission permit mechanism investment incentives decrease only if widespread
non-compliance induces a (suﬃcient) reduction in the permit price. Our results are valid
for fairly general characteristics of the monitoring and enforcement strategies commonly
found in both, theoretical and empirical applications.
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11 Introduction
The performance of environmental policy instruments under imperfect compliance has been an-
alyzed, among others, in Downing and Watson [1974], Harford [1978], Jones [1989], Malik [1990],
Keeler [1991], Stranlund and Dhanda [1999], Montero [2002], Sadmo [2002], Macho-Stadler and
Perez-Castrillo [2006], Stranlund [2007], Arguedas [2008] and Rousseau and Proost [2009]. 1 All
these studies analyze the static eﬃciency properties of marketable emission permits, pollution
taxes, abatement subsidies and/or pollution standards under diﬀerent alternatives of the mon-
itoring and sanctioning policies. Generally, they analyze ﬁrms’ incentives to abate pollution
under given policy instruments with the possibility of non-compliance, and/or they determine
optimal policies under imperfect compliance. However, none of these studies analyze the dy-
namic properties of these instruments with imperfect compliance, that is, ﬁrms’ incentives to
adopt new environmental abatement technologies. However, questions about adoption incen-
tives might be particularly relevant in environmental programs with signiﬁcant non-compliance,
such as the emissions trading program for total suspended particles in Santiago, Chile (Montero
et al. [2002]) or the EPA’s National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program of the
Clean Water Act (Harrington [2003]).
By contrast, the issue of the adoption incentives under the diﬀerent environmental policy
instruments (i.e., dynamic eﬃciency), has been deeply studied in the case of perfect compliance.
In general, the ranking of optimal policy instruments when promoting the investment in cleaner
technologies depends on the structure of the regulation schemes, such as the timing of the game
(or behavior of the regulator), the output market (im)perfect competition, the damage function,
etc.2
This paper links both literature strands by analyzing technology adoption incentives in the
presence of imperfect compliance, and compares our novel results with those already obtained
under perfect compliance. Our ﬁndings show that imperfect compliance does not alter adoption
incentives in the case of either taxes or subsidies. However, investment incentives decrease
under emission permits only if the market permit price is reduced as a result of signiﬁcant
1See also Macho-Stadler [2008] for a recent overview of this literature.
2See, for example, Requate and Unold [2001, 2003] and Requate [2005] for a recent survey of the diﬀerent
ranking analyses established in the literature.
2non-compliance, whereas ﬁrms’ investment incentives increase under pollution standards.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We present the basic model and analyze
adoption incentives in the case of emission permits in section 2. In section 33 we consider
pollution taxes and abatement subsidies, while in section 4 we study pollution standards. In
each of these sections we present well-known theoretical results under perfect compliance and
introduce their imperfect compliance counterparts. We conclude in Section 5.
2 Tradable Emission Permits
Consider an industry with n ﬁrms (with n large) that emit an homogeneous pollutant. Firms
are indexed by i and the pollution discharge of ﬁrm i ∈ n is denoted by ei ∈ [0,emax
i ]. In
the absence of regulation ﬁrm i pollutes emax
i > 0. However, ﬁrm i can abate pollution by
using its installed conventional pollution abatement technology, or by adopting a new advanced
abatement technology at a ﬁxed cost Ii.3 The abatement technology of ﬁrm i is characterized by
the abatement costs function ck
i (ei), where k = {0,1} stands for the conventional and the new
(cleaner) technology, respectively. Therefore, the pairwise abatement costs comparison satisﬁes
the usual assumptions c0
i (ei) > c1
i (ei) > 0 and −c00
i (ei) > −c10
i (ei) ≥ 0 for all ei ∈ [0,emax
i ),
while limei→0 ck0
i (ei) = −∞, c00
i (emax
i ) = 0, and ck00
i (ei) > 0 for all ei ∈ [0,emax
i ].
We assume that the regulator sets an aggregate emission target ¯ E and then issues a number
S ≤ ¯ E of tradable permits, where p(S) denotes the corresponding competitive permit market
price and si ≥ 0 the number of permits hold by ﬁrm i. For simplicity, we assume that initially







3The assumption of an exogenously ﬁxed investment cost in a newer less polluting process is standard in
the technology adoption literature, while there is a speciﬁc literature that studies the incentives to innovate in
cleaner technologies undertaking research and development activities, therefore determining endogenously the
cost of the new technologies. This is normally accomplished by considering alternative competitive structures
(perfect or imperfect) in the output market (see, for example, Innes and Bial [2002] or Parry [1995, 1998]).
Nevertheless, as Requate [2005] has pointed out, this terminological distinction is not always sharp in the
literature, since Downing and White [1986] talk about innovation, whereas Milliman and Prince [1989] use the
notion of technical change, although the real subject of both studies is the incentive for adopting a (cleaner)
existing technology.
4The choice of the initial permit allocation mechanism (being them free or auctioned) does not aﬀect our
3Within this framework, a compliant ﬁrm pollutes no more than its permit holding, that is,
ei ≤ si, whereas a non-compliant ﬁrm pollutes more than its permit holding and, therefore,
ﬁrm’s violation amount deﬁnes as vi = ei − si > 0.
The regulator observes the number of permits held by each ﬁrm and uses a monitoring
strategy is characterized by an inspection probability which (weakly) depends on the violation
size, πi (vi) ∈ [0,1], with the usual properties πi (0) > 0, π0
i (vi) ≥ 0 and π00
i (vi) ≥ 0. If ﬁrm i is
inspected and found to be non-compliant, i.e., vi > 0, then it is charged a monetary sanction,
fi (vi), where fi (0) = 0, f0
i (vi) > 0 and f00
i (vi) ≥ 0.5
Within this regulatory framework, each ﬁrm i decides on (a) the amount of pollution ei, (b)
the permit holding si, and (c) whether or not to invest in the advanced abatement technology.6









i (ei) + p[si − si] + πi (vi)fi (vi);
minei,si c1





s.t. ei ≥ si. (1)







are obtained for each abatement technol-
ogy k = {0,1}, the ﬁrm decides whether to invest in the new technology by evaluation which
option results in lower minimum expected costs.7
results, as in the perfect compliance case. See proposition 2 in Requate and Unold [2001].
5Note that we allow both the inspection probability and the ﬁrm to depend on the size of the violation and
also to vary across ﬁrms. These assumptions are in line with the existing theoretical literature and consistent
with the empirical evidence. For example, in a study about the structure of the penalties for water quality
violations in Georgia, Olhaca et al. [1998] ﬁnd that the seriousness of the violation, the historical compliance
records and the size of the company strongly inﬂuence penalty levels. Among others, Rousseau and Proost
[2005] and Shavell [1992] have defended, respectively, that the inspection probability and the ﬁne depend on
the degree of non-compliance.
6That is, whether to operate with abatement costs c1
i (ei) or c0
i (ei).
7Note that a compliant ﬁrm has no incentive to choose an emission level (strictly) lower than its permit
holding, i.e. ei < si, since in that case the ﬁrm faces higher abatement costs with no additional revenue.
42.1 Firm’s Compliance Decision






i (ei) + p[si − si] + πi (vi)fi (vi)
s.t. vi ≥ 0; si ≥ 0. (2)
The lagrangian of problem (2) is the following:
L = c
k
i (ei) + p[si − si] + πi (vi)fi (vi) − µvi − λsi,
where µ ≥ 0 and λ ≥ 0 are the respective Kuhn-Tucker multipliers associated with the in-




i (ei) + π
0
i (vi)fi (vi) + πi (vi)f
0
i (vi) − µ = 0; (3)
p − π
0
i (vi)fi (vi) − πi (vi)f
0
i (vi) + µ − λ = 0; (4)
µvi = 0; µ ≥ 0; vi ≥ 0; (5)
λsi = 0; λ ≥ 0; si ≥ 0. (6)
Assuming a positive permit holding (i.e., sk
i ≥ 0 and λ = 0), and adding up conditions (3)









+ p = 0, (7)
that is, for a given permit price, the optimal pollution decision is independent of the monitoring
strategy.
Now, combining conditions (4) and (5), we have compliance (ek
i = sk
i) if and only if µ =
πi (0)f0
i (0)−p ≥ 0, that is, whenever the marginal penalty of an inﬁnitesimal violation exceeds
8This is so because our assumptions ensure that the objective function in (2) is strictly convex and the
inequality constraints are linear. Our model assumptions also ensure that the selected pollution level is strictly
positive.
5the permit price. Otherwise, we have non-compliance (ek
i > sk































and the cost of buying an additional permit must equal the marginal penalty savings. Inter-




These results are well-known in the literature on emission trading with imperfect compli-
ance.9 Therefore, under a tradable permit mechanism with perfect competition, ﬁrms’ positive
amounts of permit holdings and plausible assumptions on the monitoring and enforcement
strategies, (a) the incentives to pollute do not change under imperfect compliance −unless
extended non-compliance induced a reduction in the permit price; and (b) ﬁrms’ compliance
decisions are crucially aﬀected by the monitoring and enforcement strategies applied to them,
but they are independent on their speciﬁc technological characteristics.
2.2 Firm’s Investment Decision
As of yet, the literature has not investigated the technology adoption incentives. We now







































corresponding optimal pollution, permit holding and degree of violation decisions, respectively.
Firm i invests in the new technology if and only if the associated expected cost savings of
investing outweigh the investment costs. That is, if and only if:∆Ci = C0
i − C1
i ≥ Ii.


















































We consider ﬁrst the case of perfect compliance, i.e. πi (0)f0
i (0) ≥ p. Note that this
situation induces full compliance regardless of the technology choice, that is, v0
i = v1
i = 0.
9See, among others, Malik [1990], Keeler [1991], Stranlund and Dhanda [1999] and Stranlund [2007]. Also,
these results have been recently tested experimentally, see Murphy and Stranlund [2006].


























which is the well-known expression for the cost savings found, for example, in Requate and
Unold [2001, 2003], or Requate [2005].
Now in case of imperfect compliance, where πi(0)f0
i(0) < p, for any individual ﬁrm the





i, for all i. (12)


















































































which is exactly equal to the cost savings in equation (11) expression under perfect compliance.
As a result, besides abatement and investments costs, i.e. technological characteristics,
the only relevant variable in each ﬁrm’s investment decision is the market permit price, and
not whether the monitoring policy induces compliance or non-compliance. For a given permit
price, the expected cost savings associated with the technology adoption only depend on the
optimal pollution level, and the latter is independent of the monitoring strategy, as established
in equation (7). The investment decision is thus independent of the monitoring strategy. That
is, for a given permit price, ﬁrms that ﬁnd it proﬁtable to adopt the advanced abatement
technology under perfect compliance will also adopt it under imperfect compliance, and vice
versa.
Consequently, changes in both, the pollution level and the investment decision can only be
due to changes in the permit price, which is determined endogenously. With non-compliance,
7the demand of permits is lower than the pollution level and given a ﬁxed permit supply S, it
fully conditions the market clearing price:
X
i
si (p) = S.
Since s0
i (p) < 0, 10 a suﬃcient decrease in the demand of permits as compared to the case of
perfect compliance will cause a decrease in the permit price enough to result in over-pollution
and under-investment, as compared to the full compliance case.
Finally, an appealing implication of our study is the following. Assume two alternative
scenarios, one which induces perfect compliance (where S = ¯ E) and another one which induces
imperfect compliance (S < ¯ E), such that both lead to the same market permit price. These
two alternative scenarios are illustrated in ﬁgure 2, where the second scenario corresponds to
the particular case of full non-compliance. In the perfect compliance case the market demand




i , while permits supply
is ¯ E, yielding a clearing price of p. In the full non-compliance case permits’ demand and supply






i and S, resulting in the same clearing price. We could
think of alternative-partial compliance-outcomes with permits’ demand and supply laying in
between these two extreme cases.
In all these cases our ﬁnding is that industry adoption incentives remain the same. There-
fore, besides speciﬁc ﬁrm characteristics, the only relevant variable in the adoption decision is
the permit price.
The results on adoption incentives under emission permits can be summarized in the fol-
lowing proposition:
Proposition 1: Under emission permits, the incentives to adopt a new technology only
depend on the ﬁrms’ technological characteristics and the permit price. If two alternative mon-
itoring policies, one inducing compliance and another one inducing non-compliance, lead to the
same market price, adoption incentives remain intact.







Σ πi’fi + πi fi’
S
Figure 1: Tradable Permits
3 Pollution Taxes and Abatement Subsidies
After analyzing emission permits, we check how our results change under the alternative systems
of pollution taxes and abatement subsidies.
Assume now that the regulator imposes a tax per unit of pollution, τ > 0. In order to
introduce the possibility of non-compliance in this context, we assume that the ﬁrm reports the
pollution level to the regulator and pays taxes according to the reported level. Let ri be the
amount of pollution reported. The ﬁrm complies with the regulation if it reports the amount
of pollution emitted (ri = ei), while it does not comply with the regulation if it reports a lower
level than emitted, i.e. ri < ei. Thus, let vi = ei − ri be the amount of the violation. Now, the
ﬁrm decides on (a) the amount of pollution ei, (b) the reported level ri, and (c) whether or not









i (ei) + τri + πi (vi)fi (vi);
minei,ri c1





s.t. ei ≥ ri.
9It is straightforward to see that equation (7), (8) and (14) are obtained simply interchanging
p by τ.11 The only diﬀerence with the emission permit mechanism is that the pollution tax
is exogenously given while the market clearing permit price is endogenously determined. As a
result, the presence of imperfect compliance in this case only results in tax evasion (i.e., the
possibility of under-reporting and paying less taxes), but it does not alter either the pollution
levels or the technology adoption incentives.
The case of a subsidy per unit of abated pollution (σ > 0), with the possibility of reporting
more abatement (or less pollution) than the actual level (i.e., ri ≤ ei) is trivially obtained
by simply substituting the tax τri by the subsidy −σ (emax
i − ri) for in the above objective
function, and p by σ in equations (7), (8) and (14). Therefore, all the results concerning
pollution levels and adoption incentives with abatement subsidies under imperfect compliance
remain the same. The only diﬀerence now is that the presence of imperfect compliance results
in over-subsidization.
4 Pollution Standards
Finally, we consider how technology adoption incentives change under a system of pollution
limits or standards. Let ei > 0 be the pollution limit required for ﬁrm i. In this context,
compliant ﬁrms select a pollution level of ei ≤ ei, while non-compliant ﬁrms exceed the pollution
level, i.e. ei > ei. Therefore, the degree of violation is now deﬁned as vi = ei − ei ≥ 0, which is
detected only through monitoring.
Then, for a given standard ei, the ﬁrm decides on (a) the pollution level ei and (b) whether









i (ei) + πi (vi)fi (vi);
minei c1





s.t. ei ≥ ei.
Following a similar procedure to that of the previous sections, and for a given technology
k, ﬁrm i complies with the standard as long as πi(0)f0
i(0) ≥ −ck0
i (ei), that is, as long as the
11This is true as long as πi(0)f0
i(0) − τ ≥ 0. Otherwise, we obtain a corner solution ri = 0.
10marginal expected penalty of exceeding the ﬁrst unit is larger than the abatement cost savings.
In that case, we have ek
i = ei, and then the ﬁrm decides to adopt the new technology if and
only if the cost savings of adopting outweigh the investment costs, that is, if and only if:
∆Ci = c
0
i (ei) − c
1
i (ei) ≥ Ii.
However, technology adoption incentives change ambiguously under imperfect compliance,
as it could either decrease or increase them. Assume ﬁrst that ﬁrm i is confronted with the




i (ei). This means that the ﬁrm exceeds the standard under the conventional










































the optimal decision, while ei belongs to the choice set) and, therefore, adoption incentives
decrease with respect to the situation of perfect compliance. As a consequence, given a ﬁxed
pollution standard, the induced pollution level increases and the incentive to adopt decreases
under imperfect compliance, as compared to the situation of perfect compliance.
However, consider now the possibility of designing an imperfect monitoring policy which
induces the same pollution level as that observed under perfect compliance. This can be better
explained with the help of ﬁgure 2. The pollution standard under this alternative policy is
ei < ei, and the expected ﬁne is such that the induced pollution level under the conventional
technology is e0
i = ei. With perfect compliance, the adoption cost savings area is given by A
(note that there are abatement costs only if the ﬁrm operates with the conventional technology
k = 0). With imperfect compliance, the adoption cost savings area is given by A + B, where
area B represents the ﬁnes savings associated with technology adoption. Therefore, adoption
incentives are increased as a result of imperfect compliance.
Proposition 2: Under an emission standard, for a given induced pollution level, imperfect
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Figure 2: Pollution Standards
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we analyze the ﬁrms’ incentives to invest in advanced abatement technologies
under imperfect compliance comparing this scenario to the case of perfect monitoring. With
regard to tradable permits, we show that adoption incentives in emission permit programs do
not change, unless extended non-compliance causes a reduction in the permit price. Therefore,
changes in adoption incentives are only due to the fact that the permit price is endogenously
determined and could decrease as a consequence of a signiﬁcant reduction in the permit de-
mand. Clearly, under a system of exogenous pollution taxes or abatement subsidies with the
possibility of under-reporting, the pollution levels as well as the investment decisions by the
ﬁrms would not change. Imperfect compliance in these alternative contexts would only cause
either tax evasion or over-subsidization. Finally, we do not ﬁnd an unambiguous response with
respect to pollution standards with imperfect compliance, as ﬁrm’s adoption decision depends
on the alternative imperfect monitoring policies that the regulator may implement. If both,
the perfect and imperfect compliance policies, consider the same pollution standard, adoption
incentives are lower under imperfect compliance. However, if both the perfect and imperfect
12compliance policies induce the same pollution level under the conventional technology, then
adoption incentives with imperfect compliance increase when compared to the perfect monitor-
ing scenario.
Our results contribute to relate two large strands of literature by setting up the framework
to bridge the gap between them. The ﬁrst one studies policy instruments under perfect and
imperfect compliance but neglecting technology adoption (static setting) and the second one
studies policy adoption incentives in a dynamic setting under alterative policy instruments, but
neglecting the monitoring strategy of the regulator. With respect to the former, unresolved
issues have to do with the welfare implications of allowing tax evasion (or over-subsidization)
in dynamic settings that consider technology adoption. With respect to the latter, while do not
intend to provide a ranking of optimal policy instruments, our results under imperfect compli-
ance are quite robust as they would hold regardless of particular speciﬁc designs characterizing
the structure of the regulation policy, including the timing of the game, the behavior of the
regulator, or features of the damage functions.
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